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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Case No. 18134

Plaintiff/Respondent,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
VS.
..
. . .....

BRENT BINDRUP,

-·..

Defendant/ Appellant. ,
'

,);

~

.·.

~;;.

~?

\

i-

;

."'.-=.-

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE

or

THE CASE

Appellant appeals from· a conviction of murder in the 2nd
Judic:~al

degree in the Second

District Court, Weber County,

State of Utah, the Honorable Calvin Gould presiding.
"

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was found guilty of murder in the 2nd degree in a
non-jury trial held before the Honorable Calvin Gould, on
.

...

~ ..:':
:

. ·~ ··.

Appellant was sentenced to a term of five

September 21, 1981.

' ·•

years to life in the Utah1State Prison.
suspended

and~the appellartt~was

The sentence was

placed on probation.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On August 8, 1980, at approximately 1:50 a.m., appellant
was travelling southbound on Washington Boulevard in Ogden, Utah,
when he went through a red light at the intersection of 31st
Street and Washington Boulevard, and collided with a motorcycle
driven by the victim.

The victim was travelling east on 31st

Street and had lawfully e~te~ed the intersection on a green light.
The motorcyclist was killed and, although appellant's truck went
into a spin and overturned, the truck's occupants were not
seriously injured.

The appellant had been drinking and the
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I,

I

I

evidence
at trial indicated a blood alcohol level of .12%, r:
1
i

I;

approximately one hour after the accident.

There was also ,

1
I:

f.

evidence that appellant had, prior to the accident, run through
I:
I

i

at least two other red lights on Washington Boulevard, and was
I

~ravelling

Var~ous

in excess of the 35 mph posted speed limit.

witnesses estimated the speed of the appellant's vehicle at
~

between 40 mph and 59 mph.
I;

I

t'
t

l

At the first preliminary hearing held on October 23, 1980,

before the Honorable Stanton M. Taylor, Judge of the Ogden Circuit
t;

Court, the prosecution attempted to get a bind over on a 2nd
t

I

I'

q~gree
: I

~~t·

murder charge.

However, Judge Taylor felt that thisdwas

the type of situation the legislature meant to encompass

w~thin

the murder statute.

Judge Taylor did find probable cause

I

. that the crime of manslaughter had been committed and bound the
case over to the Second Judicial District Court on that charge.
I 1
I

The prosecution dismissed the charge of manslaughter and went
back to the Ogden Circuit Court on the charge of 2nd degree ,murder.
A, preliminary hearing was held before the Honorable E. F. Ziegler
ri
r:

on July 10, 1981, and, again the defense argued that the 2nd degree
'1

murder statute did not apply to the facts of this case.

However,

I,

Judge Ziegler found probable cause that the crime had been
I

cbnnnitted and the appellant was bound over on the charge of. 2nd
degree murder.
The trial was held on September 3, 1981, before the Honorable
Calvin Gould, Judge of the Second Judicial District Court, Weber
Gpunty, Utah, sitting without a jury.

After hearing the evidence,
t•···.~

Jpdge Gould took the matter under advisement and rendered
11
''
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memorandum decision on September 21, 1981, finding the appellant
guilty of 2nd degree murder'.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW
IN FINDING THAT THE APPELLANT'S CONDUCT
EVIDENCED THE ,~-PEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE FOR
HUMAN LIFE" REQUIRED BY UTAH'S SECOND
DEGREE MURDER STATUTE. ·
Appellant was convicted of a 1st degree felony based upon a
violation of UCA Section

76~5-203(l)(c).

Specifically, this

section states:
Criminal homicide constitutes murder in
the second degree if the actor:

<a) . . .

~;:_..

(b) . . .

. ,.

under circumstances evidencing a
depraved indifference to human life, he
recklessly engaged in conduct which
creates a grave risk of death to another
and thereby causes the death of another.

A~ting

It is a universally held view in our criminal justice system,
that a conviction of murder requires a showing of malice on the
part of the accused.

In

the~case

of Farrow v. Smith, 541 P.2d,
...

,

.

1107 (Utah 1975), the Utah Supreme Court made it clear that Utah
adheres to this fundamental principle.

The court states in that

case that:
For many years the definition of second
degree murder ·has been the.· unlawful killing
of a human be~ng with mali~e aforethought,
and that of manslaughter was the unlawful
killing of a human being without malice.
In our opinion, the new criminal code has
not changed those definitions. Id at 1109.
See also State v. ·Lingman, 91 P.2d 457 (Utah 1939); State v.
Barker, 196 P.2d 723 (Utah 1948.)
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~J

The issue of what is meant by implied malice was squarely

c~nfronted

by the Supreme Court of· Arizona in the case of State

v, 1 Chalmers, 411 P. 2d 448 (Arizona 1966.)

In that case, the

defendant was travelling on a two lane highway at between
J ..

80 mph

and 100 mph, and passed several cars going in the same direction.
!

Iln doing so, the defendant forced two vehicles, coming the opposite
d~rection,

to completely leave the highway to avoid a collision.

Defendant swerved back into his own lane and then, shortly ·
thereafter, attempted to pass more vehicles when he collided'
h~ad-on into two vehicles in the opposite lane, causing two1

fatalities and three serious injuries.
of 2nd degree murder and appealed.

Defendant was convicted

The court admitted that:

There is sufficient evidence for the
jury to find gross negligence and
utter disregard of the safety or
welfare of any person who might have
been in the vicinity of defendant's
car;

tl
'l

1

'I

t •

but held that due to the lack of showing of malice, or as they
called it:
i' 11

An abandoned or malignant heart, the
defendant was not guilty of murder.
At 452.
In the case of Blackwell v. Maryland, 369 A.2d 53 (Md. 1977),

the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland explored the same issue.
In that case, a teenage girl riding a bicycle with lights and
reflectors, was killed by an intoxicated driver who was weaving
on and off the road.

The defendant made no attempt to stop,

either before or after hitting the girl.

The trial judge gave

~ '

a lengthy discussion of the malice, implied or actual, required
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for a conviction of murder and discussed the gross negligence,
wanton and reckless conduct that fs required for a finding of
manslaughter.

In overturning the conviction, the appeals

court ruled that the trial judge erred, as a matter of law, in
presenting the issue of murder to the jury becau~1e of clear lack
of malice.
p~~sent

The appellant, in the

case, was convicted of 2nd

degree murder by the Honorable Calvin Gould.

The only case that

,)

Judge Gould refers to in

his.~_memorandum

decision is the Utah

~upreme Court case of State··y. Nicholson, 585 P.1d 60 (1978 Utah.)
;.;.~

·_

In . the Nicholson case the cburt explains the term "depraved
"
.indifference"
by listing five . cases which represent examples of

that type of conduct.

Four ··of these cases are, People v. Burden,
..

140 Ca. Rptr. 282 (1977), starvation of a five month old child;
Gibson v. State, 476 P.2d 362 (Okl. Cir. 1979), prisoner grabbing
a steering wheel of sheriff's car while in transit; State v.
Hokenson, 527 P.2d 487 (Idaho 1974), killing a policeman with a
bomb; and State v. Draves, 524 P.2d 1225 (Ore. 1974), reckless
shooting of a gun into a crowd.
\

Each of these cases clearly conform

I·

to the concept of implied malice.

The fifth case of Wagner v. State,

250 NW 2d 331 (1977 Wis.) is the only case where the facts bear
any resemblance to the case presently before the court.
;

This

Wisconsin Supreme Court case is mis-cited in the Nicholson case
and, therefore, the holding.is incorrectly used in Judge Gould's
memorandum decision.
In the Wagner case, the Wisconsin Court renders an excellent
discussion on what is meant by a depraved mind.

In that case, the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

\:

d~f endant

had ingested pain medication and enough alcohol te have

I

a .178% blood alcohol two hours after the incident.
1

1

The def,endant

wps driving a high powered automobile and was waiting at a red '
light when another car stopped and a challenge to race was
accepted.

The two vehicles proceeded to race doWI1 the

town~s

main street and the defendant's vehicle struck and killed a·
pedestrian.

The vehicles did not stop, but continued -racing:

down Central Avenue.

The defendant's car was seen speeding across

railraod tracks at approximately 50 mph, causing sparks to fly.
A !witness led the police to the defendant's car.
1

In overturning

the appellant's murder conviction the court observes that:

;
!

i

\;
•

1. ~

t:

To constitute a depraved mind, more
than· a high degree of negligence or
recklessness must exist. The mind
must not only disregard the safety
of another, but be devoid of regard
for the life of another. A depraved
mind lacks the moral sense and
appreciation of life, and is
unreasonable ·and lacks judgment. A
depraved mind has the general intent
to do the acts and the consciousness
of the nature of the acts and possible
result but lacks the specific intent
to do the harm. Id at 340.
In other words, the court is saying that the legislature did

not put the word "depraved" in the statute as mere surplusage.
The state must show that the defendant was aware or should have
been aware that his conduct was innninently dangerous to human life,
It is not necessary to show that a defendant intended to kill any
specific individual.

However, it is not enough to show that the

defendant's conduct could conceivably result in someone's death.
The distinction is important because it rightfully reserves ;the
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I

L

murder statute for those cases where malice or a clear substitute
I

for malice is present.

For example, if parents fail to feed an

infant, they may, not consciously intend that the infant should
die, but it is reasonable for the law to place the burden on the
parents that they should have known... If a person drives a car
or shoots a gun into a

crow~

of people without intending to kill

'

'

anyone, it is also reasonable
for the law to assume that a normal
..
,,

moral person would realize. that, regardless of intent, someone
will probably die.

These are cases wh.ere a "depraved indifference"

on the part of the actor e~ists and the law will imply malice .
. ''

The Wisconsin Court in Wagner, supra, recognized that the
defendant's conduct created a situation of unreasonable risk of
injury.

However, the court ruled that the fact situation was
1

.

.,

insufficient to show that defendant's conduct constituted a
depraved mind.

'

-

. ·, l

The court also found that the defendant lacked

the state of mind necessary for him to be found guilty of 2nd
degree murder.

In the present case, the appellant was driving while intoxicated
at a speed of. somewhat over the limit·.· The streets were virtually
deserted at

2~00

a.m., and the defend&nt foolishly and negligently

drove through several intersections with red lights.

Anytime

someone runs through a red_light there is the danger of an accident.
But, the facts are that the vast majority of times that someone
passes through a red light_, there is no resulting incident.

On

this particular occasion, the appellant's truck and the victim's
motorcycle arrived at the same point at the same time and a
terrible tragedy occurred.

The appellant did not intend for the
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.,
1l

• J

I,

I

d

event to occur.

No one can claim that the appellant, even

l,;

unconsciously, intended to kill the victim in this case as
I

"

required by the concept of malice.

·i.

The court in the Wagner .•
tJ

t

~

t\

J

srpra, case referred to an earlier Wisconsin case of Seidler v.
t1

':

State, 219 N·. W. 2d 320. (1974), and stated that:
It was not the lack of evidence of any
intent to harm' the deceased in Seidler,
~. which this court found critical,
~ather the lack of intent to do the
act which resulted in the death, i.e.,
a lack of evidence· that Seidler
consciously threw the victim at the hard
and unyielding portions of the bed.
Id at 341.

;(

d

i

Likewise, in the case before this court, no one has ar§ued
that the appellant intended to run his vehicle into
v~hicle

~9uld
,

another~.l.

under circumstances where he should have known thattsomeone

be killed or injured as would be required to show implied

~~li~e.
;~

~

The state could only introduce evidence that the defendant

may have intended to run the red light.

Even this evidence was

controverted by the testimony of the psychiatrist.

From this

showing, the prosecution tried to imply that the appellant should
~:

have known that he would collide with another car and, further,
that this inevitable collision would cause the death of another.
·'

By accepting the prosecution's argument, the trial court has
~

attempted to stretch and contort the parameters of the murder
statute to include what was, under the circumstances, an automobile
accident.

The appellant was not acting under circumstances where

a person should have known the event would

d:id not

de;'~nstrate

occur~

a depraved indifference to the

The appellant

li;;~ of
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the .

victim.

In fact, the evidence at trial tended to show that he

was badly shaken by the results of his actions.
It was the clear lack of malice in the present case which
caused Judge Stanton Taylor, in the first preliminary hearing,
to refuse to bind over the case on a murder charge.

Judge Taylor

•\

stated that:
The court does.riot believi that it was
the intent of the legislature to cover
this type of incident with your second
d¢gree murder statute. !~believe that
in order to be. cbnvicted of a second
d~gree murder urid~r these circumstances,
the defendant would have to be aware of
the presence of~·,::either the victim or
someone like him. In other words,
some specific knowledge that a person
is being endangered by my conduct, not
a generalized ~nowledge that someone
might be ther~, ,. ~ome potential hazard,
but a specific knowledge that a person
is there and I;am creating a danger to
him through my willful indifference to
his safety.
First preliminary hearing transcript,
page ss.
Although Judge

Taylor'~

remarks are, in no way, binding upon

this court, appellant contends that the judge has correctly
expressed the state of the. law in Utah.

That the terms "depraved
,;

indifference to human life" and "grave risk of

d~ath"

require a

showing that the appellant was aware of a person•s presence and
aware that his conduct would probably result in a person's death
or near death, and that the appellant continued in his course of
conduct

~ith

no concern fot the consequences.

The facts in the

present
case showed that the appellant ran through a red light
...
. in' the middle of the night when the streets were virtually ·deserted.
The appellant was not acting under some depraved death wish
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and, clearly, ·had no intention of hurting himself or anyone
else.

The evidence at trial showed that the appellant was

d~eply

distressed and concerned for the victim of the accident

and showed great remorse for the results of his foolish behavior.
Had the appellant had any real belief that his actions would
result in another's death, he would not have run the red light.
POINT II
DEFENDANT'S ACTIONS, AS A MATTER OF
LAW, CONSTITUTED AUTOMOBILE HOMICIDE
AS SET OUT IN THE UTAH CODE.
The Utah Automobile Homicide Statute, UCA 76-5-207, at· ·the

t'i.me of this offense, read ~as follows:
,,
II

•,

.
I

;

J

'

Criminal Homicide constitutes automobile
homicide if the actor, while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor, a
controlled substance, or any drug, to
a degree which renders the actor
incapable of safely driving a vehicle,
causes the death of another by operating
a motor vehicle in a negligent manner.
The above statute was interpreted by this court in its

decision of State v. Chavez, 605 P.2d 1226 (1979.)
c~se,

In the Chavez

the court determined that the statute requires the state to

show that the defendant acted with criminal negligence rather than
just simple negligence.
The appellant contends that if he is guilty of a crime,.
that crime should be automobile homicide.

.The Chavez case is

helpful to the present case in three respects:

The facts, the

holding and the dissenting opinion.
The facts in Chavez are as follows:

The defendant was

travelling down State Street in Salt Lake City, Utah, at a high

.,
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rate of speed when he approached the intersection of ·3900 South
facing a red light.
w~re

It was 10:00 p.m., and the lanes of traffic

blocked by several cars waiting for the red light.

d~fendant

The

veered out of the lanes of traffic, drove on the gutter

around the other cars

waiti~g

for the light to change, and went

into the intersection where he collided with a car travelling on
3900 South, killing a two year old boy.

'

The facts in the Chavez case are more aggregious than the
present case in many respects.
S~ate

Chavez was driving at a time when

Street was congested with traffic.

l~ght,

w~iting

He not only ran a red

but actually had to veer off the road to get around vehicles
for the red light, arid his blood alcohol registered!pt .19%.

Yet, in this case, the Utah' Supreme Court wasn't grappling
'

problem of murder or manslaughter.
if the

deg~ee

They were trying to

~~th

the

det~Fmine

of culpability evidenced by Chavez was great erough

to impose ah automobile homicide conviction.
Chavez appealed his automobile homicide conviction on the
basis that the court had instructed the jury that only simple
negligence was required.

Chavez claimed that a showing of criminal

negligence was required.

The Supreme Court of Utah agreed and

remanded the case for retrial to determine if Chavez's actions
constituted criminal negligence.

The law stated in Chavez was

later overruled by the legislature but at the time of appellant's
accident, Chavez was the law in Utah.

The court was clear in the

Chavez case, holding that:
We are, therefore, of the opinion that
our previous cases holding that automobile
homicide requires only proof of simple
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negligence under Section 76-5-207, are in
error and are overruled. And we hold that
a conviction of automobile homicide requires
an instruction on criminal negligence as
that term is defined in Section 76-2-103(4).
Id at 1228.
Criminal negligence is defined in Section 76-2-103:
A person engages in conduct:
( 1) .. .
( 2) .. .
(3) .. .

(4) With criminal negligence or is
criminally negligent with respect to
circumstances surrounding his conduct
or the result of his conduct when he ·
ought to be aware of a substantial and
unjustiaf iable risk that the circumstances
exist or the result will occur. The risk
must be of such a nature and degree that
the failure to perceive it constitutes a
gross deviation from the standard of care
that an ordinary person would exercise in
all the circumstances as viewed from the
actor's standpoint.
This appears to be an accurate and appropriate description
of appellant's conduct in the case now before the court.
Finally, the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Crockett
recognizes an important principle.

Crockett made it clear that

he felt that Chavez's actions were exactly what was contemplated
in the definition of automobile homicide and he affirms an important
rule of law that should be considered in the present case.

He

states that:
The universally accepted rule is that a specific
statute takes precedence over a general one.
Therefore, the definition of defendant's
crime is found in the just quoted (automobile
homicide) statute. Id at 1229.
73 American Jurisprudence 2d, Statutes, Section 257, indicates
that:
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"

I

Where there is in the same statute a
specific provision and also a general
one which in its most comprehensive
sense would include matters embraced iri
the former, the:particular provision
must control, and the general provision
must be taken tb: affect only such cases
within its general language as are not
within the provisions of the particular
provisions.
In addition to

Justic~-Crockett!~_

opinion in the Chavez

case, the Utah Supreme Court in Millert v. Clark Clinic Corp.,
• •,. r~ •~•

'":

:

"'.

609 P.2d 934 (Utah 1980); Bateman v. ·Board of Examiners, 322 P.2d
., .

. ,.

381(Utah1958); Pacific Irttermountain Express Co. v. State Tax
Commission, 316 P.2d 549 (Utah 1957); State v. Burnham, 49 P.2d
963 (Utah 1935); has held that the State of Utah adheres to this
general principle.
In the

p~es~nt
;,
·:,

'-:,, )'.
~

:

-.- ~((

case, there is no question that the appellant

.

:·, r •

was operating-:a motor vehicle while under the influence of
.

~·

,i·

.. ....

~

\

intoxicating liquor and thereby caused another's death.
.

I

'The Chavez case confirms that at the time of the appellant's
'

accident, a conviction of automobile homicide required a showing
.

of criminal negligence.

--,-

Appellant denies that he was acting with

any kind of malice, either _implied or actual. ·However, appellant
concedes that his conduct was arguably criminally negligent as
;.

defined by th~t statute.
~POINT

III

WHEN THE SAME CONDUCT IS PROSCRIBED BY
TWO DIFFERENT CRIMINAL PENALTIES, THE
ACCUSED IS ENTITLED TO THE BENEFIT OF
THE LESSER.
In the Utah State Supreme Court case of State v. Shondel,
453 P.2d 146 (Utah 1969), a case involving possession of LSD, this
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-J,. .... -

court adhered to the general criminal principle that where the
d~fendant's
!

conduct is encompassed by two different criminal

I

penalties, that the accused should be convicted of tpe lesser.
I:

This general rule is summarized in 50 ALR 1531, where it states
that:
The safest of all rules, in the construing
of criminal statutes of doubtful meaning,
is to resolve the ambiguity into the
milder construction, in favor of the
party accused. Id at 1533 and 1534.
. The United States Supreme Court affirmed this rule in the
,, .

caRe of United States v. Universal CIT Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218,
73 S. Ct. 227, . 97. L. Ed. 260 (1952.)

In the initial preliminary hearing, Judge Taylor felt that
the state had made out a case against the appellant for manslaughter.
However, the Utah Supreme Court has ruled that driving a vehicle
while intoxicated constitutes an act of recklessness in the cases
of State v. Wade, 572 P.2d 398 (Utah 1977); State v. Anderson, 561
P.2d 1061 (Utah 1977); and State v. Durrant, 561 P.2d 1056 (Utah
1977.)

Also, under the manslaughter statute, this court has ruled

in State v. Adamson, 125 P.2d 429 (Utah 1942); and State v. Olsen,
160 P.2d 427 (Utah 1945), that a defendant must be shown to have
acted with criminal negligence.

Therefore, from the above cases

and the ruling in Chavez, which requires criminal negligence for
an automobile homicide conviction, we find that the culpability
distinction between the two statutes is virtually obliterated.
~

Therefore, the appellant contends that he is entitled to the
benefit of the lesser statute, that of automobile homicide.
:t
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CONCLUSION
The state failed to show any form of malice on the part of
appellant as required by Utah's second degree murder statute.
Therefore, the trial court erred as a matter of law in finding
~

that the appellant's conduct evidenced the depraved indifference
.

for human, life that is

-

req~~red

by-the statute.

The cases cited

by this court in the Nicholson case and subsequently cited by
the trial court substantiate the appellant's claim.
'!.~

A person who sets off a bomb in a crowded area or a person
who drives his car at high speed into a parade, or the person who
shoots a gun into a crowded theater, is clearly guilty of 2nd
deg~ee

murder.

That is a far cry from'. the factual situation in

the.present case.

The appellant's conduct was inappropriate and

foolhardy and resulted in

a

terrible tragedy.

However, to construe

the totality of the circumstances in this case to, in some way,,
imply a· state of maliciousri~ss on the part of the appellant would
i.'•r

blur.the concept of malice to the point of making it meaningless.
There is absolutely no reason for this court to do that.
The legislature has enacted the statute of automobile homicide,
~

which clearly and distinctly covers the factual situation presented

by this case.

This court has affirmed that it adheres to the

general rule that when a specific statute proscribes a certain
set ?f facts, the specific ·statute should be used as opposed to a
general statute which may also, in a broader sense, cover the
same circumstances.

Further, this court has indicated that it

follows the rule of statutory construction that entitles the
accused to the benefit of the lesser of two statutes that describe
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the same conduct.
The appellant contends that the murder in the 2nd

degr~e

l

conviction should be overturned and a conviction entered for
automobile homicide.
Respectfully submitted this

~
qday

of March, 1982.

'.

I

''

I
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